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Abstract
We study taxable wealth in unique Swedish administrative data, annually fol-
lowing a large sample of households over a period of almost 40 years. The
maindatalimitationisnon-observabilityofwealthforthosebelowthetaxex-
emption level. This implies that much of the focus of the paper is on the rich,
since we are conﬁned to those whose wealth becomes taxable over time. We
exploit the long panel dimension by estimating dynamic ‘ﬁxed effects’ mod-
els for limited dependent variables that allow for individual heterogeneity in
both constants and autoregressive parameters, and control for heterogeneity
through observables. We ﬁnd substantial wealth mobility over the long time
spans, partly accounted for by life-cycle behavior, while sufﬁciently captur-
ing dynamics by an AR(1) process at the individual level.
Keywords: wealthmobility, wealthdynamics, lifecycle, heterogeneity, panel
data
EconLit subject descriptors: C230, D140, D310, D910, H2405
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Non-technical Summary
We analyze changes in individual households’ taxable wealth over the entire work-
ing life cycle. Doing so is important in order to understand the role of various fac-
tors that affect changes in wealth along individuals’ life cycle paths and between
individual wealth accumulation trajectories. Differences in (changes) in wealth can
come about due to life cycle savings and consumption decisions, due to luck, the
timing of luck, policy, and differences in incomes, and unobservables.
Wealth (net worth) as the single most important summary measure of an indi-
viduals’ potential to consume is in fact widely distributed in the population, and
public policy is concerned with that distribution which is highly concentrated at
the top. Policy makers not only want us to be able to characterize the cross sec-
tional distribution of wealth and measure wealth inequality at a given point in time,
or show the correlates of wealthiness, but also to provide evidence on how much
persistence there is in this inequality and how the heterogeneous paths into and out
of the top can lead to a characterization of wealth dynamics and mobility.
Our administrative data from Sweden follow a large sample of households over
a considerable part of individual life cycles for many. There are close to 40 annual
observations for some individuals.
The key variables we use are annual taxable net wealth at the individual level
and at the household level from 1968 and onwards. The data allows a precise
assessment of taxpayers’ wealth—but, unfortunately, not of non-taxpayers’. The
very long individual time series allow us to study “individual wealth trajectories”,
at least for those who pay wealth taxes at some stage.
Given limitations in observability, our empirical study is conﬁned to analyses
of whether individual households cross a(n absolute or relative) wealth threshold
in any particular year, while allowing for a sufﬁciently rich dynamic structure.
We explicitly account for measurable determinants of wealth, but also allow for
individual-speciﬁc unobserved determinants of wealth holding and wealth dynam-
ics. Accounting for such detail on individual heterogeneity has, to our knowledge,
not been done and not been possible before in this context.
Our main results are:
∙ We ﬁnd results indicating a very large degree of heterogeneity in wealth tra-
jectories. The parameters capturing individual dynamics vary substantially
in the population. There is, in other words, considerable heterogeneity even
among those in the top percentages in the wealth distribution.
∙ We also ﬁnd considerable movements into and within the top percents in
the wealth distribution. This is not quite consistent with previous results for
Sweden.
Our estimates, based on data of a sample of households ever becoming taxable,
do not reﬂect the full dynamics and mobility patterns that come about by changes
in wealth entirely below or above the threshold.6
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1 Introduction
Who becomes wealthy? Who stays wealthy? And who will always remain poor?
The opportunities to accumulate wealth create incentives for education, work ef-
fort, and entrepreneurship. We would expect considerable wealth mobility if these
incentives are strong and affect behavior. As people differ in many respects, we
would also expect to see considerable heterogeneity in wealth trajectories.
We study movements of individuals and households in the wealth distribution
over time and, therefore, as they age in this paper. The data available allow us to
track households’ wealth transitions over most of their working lives. This makes
our data unique. Those getting rich not only increase their wealth over time in
an absolute sense, but they also move through the wealth distribution and improve
their position in the wealth ranking. Wealth distributions are highly skewed. For
instance, the top percent of households owns about one third of private net worth
in the US. This fact makes it necessary to capture the top percentiles in a reliable
way. It is a strength that the data we use meet this requirement.
The degree of intragenerational wealth mobility is important when discussing
different economic issues. First, wealth accumulation is the result of choices con-
cerning labor supply, consumption, and savings. Life-cycle models predict that
individuals will accumulate wealth while working and then decumulate when re-
tired. One set of issues concern how well the life-cycle model predicts the actual
age-wealth proﬁles and if these proﬁles differ between individuals. Another issue
is if controlling for other determinants of wealth reduces the observed heterogene-
ity in age-wealth proﬁles. While we can, in principle, control for education, other
important determinants of wealth accumulation such as entrepreneurial ability, are
inherently unobservable.
Second, wealth mobility reﬂects the extent to which there is equality of op-
portunity in a society. If there is equality of opportunity, the wealth of a young
person will not be a good predictor of this person’s wealth when middle aged.
Suppose that entrepreneurship and risk taking sometimes for some yield consider-
able wealth increases. If wealth taxation reduces entrepreneurship and risk taking,
we would then expect reduced wealth mobility. Wealth during different phases
of the life cycle will be highly correlated if, on the other hand, inherited wealth
is important. Inheritances are, however, very unequally distributed. This means
that if inheritances are important for wealth then inheritances will be a source of
heterogeneity.
Finally, from a macroeconomic perspective, more and more modeling efforts
arebeingspentonaccommodatingagentheterogeneityintomodelsexplainingcon-
sumption and saving behavior, investment, or business cycles. Recent literature
tries to escape from the straightjacket assumptions and implications of represen-
tative agent economies.1 The degree of heterogeneity in dynamic wealth accu-
mulation appears to be unknown, however, judging from macroeconomic studies
1See, for instance, Browning et al. (1999) and Bertola (2000).7
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that calibrate models to moments of the cross sectional wealth distribution.2 We
provide descriptive evidence on heterogeneity in dynamic wealth accumulation,
evidence that can be compared to the properties of calibrated models.
ThepreviousliteratureonwealthmobilityincludesHurstetal.(1998), Jianako-
plos and Menchik (1997), Keister (2005), and Steckel and Krishnan (2006) who all
study wealth mobility in the US. Jappelli and Pistaferri (2000) study wealth mo-
bility in Italy. Klevmarken et al. (2003) and Klevmarken (2004) are among the
previous papers on wealth mobility in Sweden.
These studies are based in wealth observations, in the time dimension, for 2–4
years. Wealth mobility is studied by comparing individual households’ positions
in the wealth distribution, in most cases, 5–7 years apart. Sometimes the time span
is down to 2 years, sometimes up to 10–15 years apart. The sample sizes are quite
small, inthecross-sectiondimensionthereareobservationsfor1,000–5,000house-
holds. Wealth mobility is often coarsely deﬁned as movements between quartiles,
quintiles, or deciles in the wealth distribution.
Most studies ﬁnd that the probabilities to stay poor and remain rich are com-
paratively high. Wealth mobility is predominantly high in the middle of the wealth
distribution. The previous literature consists of single country studies. Klevmarken
et al. (2003) is the only exception. This paper compares wealth mobility in the US
and Sweden. Contrary to what many might have conjectured, Klevmarken et al.
(2003) ﬁnd that wealth mobility in Sweden is as high as in the US.
The previous literature is, however, limited by the small number of observa-
tions. In the time dimension, the few observations for speciﬁc individuals for dif-
ferent years can only account for very limited parts of the individual’s life cycle. In
the cross section dimension, the few observations of different individuals for a spe-
ciﬁc year means that observations can only be grouped into a few quantiles. This
implies that the measure of mobility becomes imprecise when mobility is deﬁned
as movements between quantiles. With few individuals it also becomes difﬁcult to
study patterns in individual heterogeneity. These limitations also reduce the pos-
sible choices of empirical methods to study mobility. In addition, the previous
literature is based on survey data. Surveys tend not to do so well in covering the
top percents of the wealth distribution.
We believe that we can deal with these shortcomings of the previous literature.
The data available to us are from the LINDA data base, an administrative source
from Statistics Sweden. This data base provides long individual time series, many
individuals, and the top percents of the wealth distribution well documented. This
enables us to improve considerably on the analysis of wealth mobility.
The LINDA data base includes 3 percent of the Swedish population and their
household members. There are 300,000 households and 700,000 individuals in
this data base. We can follow a considerable part of individual life cycles for many.
There are close to 40 annual observations for some individuals.
The key variables we use are annual taxable net wealth at the individual level
2Examples are Huggett (1996), Casta˜ neda et al. (2003), and Cagetti and De Nardi (2009).8
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and at the household level from 1968 and onwards.3 A main advantage with this
data set is that for those who do pay taxes there are very precise wealth measure-
ments available.4
This means that our measure of wealth mobility is very closely related to
whether or not the individual pays wealth taxes. Wealth mobility is interpreted as
the movements in and out of the top percents of the wealth distribution over time
and, also, movements over time within the top percents. As an alternative we also
use an absolute real wealth measure, movements across a real wealth threshold.
The very long individual time series allow us to study “individual wealth tra-
jectories”, at least for those who pay wealth taxes at some stage. Accounting for
such detail on individual heterogeneity has, to our knowledge, not been done and
not been possible before in this context.
We present empirical estimates of nonlinear dynamic panel data models con-
trolling for measurable determinants of wealth. At the same time we allow for
individual (household) heterogeneity in both constants and autoregressive coefﬁ-
cients that describe short-run dynamics. Our main results are:
∙ We ﬁnd results indicating a very large degree of heterogeneity in wealth
trajectories. The autoregressive coefﬁcients vary substantially in the popula-
tion. There is, in other words, considerable heterogeneity even among those
in the top percentages in the wealth distribution.
∙ We also ﬁnd considerable movements into and within the top percents in
the wealth distribution. This is not quite consistent with previous results for
Sweden presented by Klevmarken (2004).
Our estimates, based on data of a sample of households ever becoming taxable,
do not reﬂect the full dynamics and mobility patterns that come about by changes
in wealth entirely below or above the threshold.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents our theoretical
framework. In Section 3, we present the data and how the data set was constructed.
We also present some descriptive results in this section. Section 4 presents our
econometric approach. The evidence from the main speciﬁcations can be found in
Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical framework
The objective of this section is to provide a theoretical framework for studying
wealth and wealth accumulation. We will discuss the various determinants and
sources of wealth (or its absence).
3Taxable wealth at the household level was also the actual tax base during the studied period.
4A disadvantage is that wealth information in the register data is only available for those whose
taxable wealth exceeds the high tax exemption levels.9
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2.1 Determinants of wealth accumulation and wealth heterogeneity
Think of a young adult in her early or mid 20’s. When starting out in working
life she has been given some initial conditions provided by her parents. There are
four main ways by which parents can make transfers to their children: First, there
are biological transfers of natural talents and abilities (genes). Second, parents
can also transfer ﬁnancial and tangible property by inter vivos gifts and bequests.
For our young adult these intergenerational transfers are probably expected rather
than already realized. Third, parents can contribute to the formal education and
other human capital investments of the child. Finally, parents can provide ‘social
capital’, for example, values, manners, and access to social networks.
Parents are different and transfers will differ. The transfers from parents will,
therefore, create an initial heterogeneity among young adults entering working life.
Family background will, in other words, be important for, among other things,
wealth and wealth accumulation. We are here talking about conditions like par-
ents’ education, occupation, and marital status. Family size and family income
and wealth are also important family background characteristics. Culture, religion,
race, and ethnicity are also characteristics that have been mentioned in the litera-
ture.
Gender and country of birth are other characteristics that contribute to initial
heterogeneity. It may also be important to which birth cohort the individual be-
longs. Birth cohorts differ in size, but things like the date of labor market entry
may also differ between cohorts for exogenous reasons.
Given the initial conditions our young adult will make choices and continue to
do so during her life. Her preferences–for example, her time preference rate and
her risk attitude–will be important for her choices. One of the outcomes will have
to do with the path of her working life. Important dimensions of this are hours of
work, occupation, career path, and entrepreneurship.
Another decision is the consumption path over the life cycle. The optimal
consumption path will not necessarily follow the income path. Life cycle saving
in general and retirement saving in particular will follow from the choices made.
The future savings of our young adult might also be affected if she wishes to leave
a bequest or if she, because of uncertainty, saves for precautionary reasons.
This will, of course, result in wealth accumulation and decumulation over the
life cycle. But wealth might also be affected by the investment behavior of the
individual, for example, the portfolio composition.
The time and age pattern of demographic choices will also affect wealth. Mar-
ital status, family size, and the number of children are important characteristics.
Our young adult might be lucky or unlucky during the course of life. Windfalls
such as unexpected inheritances, lottery winnings, and gambling winnings will
increase wealth, at least temporary.
But windfalls might affect many and not only speciﬁc individuals. Asset prices
might move so that the wealth of many is affected simultaneously. This is one ex-
ample of how general economic conditions might affect wealth. The taxation of10
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wealth is another example. The differences between living in different geographi-
cal locations may also change over time.
With this sketch of the factors that might affect wealth and wealth accumula-
tion, we will now turn to a more formal discussion of the individual’s life cycle
choices.
2.2 Optimal wealth accumulation
The objective of this subsection is to discuss the implications for wealth accumu-
lation of the choices the individual makes concerning consumption and savings.5
The approach is to start by focusing on the modeling assumptions needed to have
individuals making the same choices rather than different choices.
Suppose that there is no uncertainty. Individuals have the same length of life
and no bequest motives. They meet the same constant rate of interest. Each house-
hold consists of a single individual. Utility is additively separable, the instanta-









where U is utility, u is instantaneous utility with decreasing marginal utility, t is
time, T∗ is the length of life, C is consumption, and ρ is the time preference, by












where r is the rate of interest, R is the retirement age, E is earnings, and W0 is the
value of initial wealth in the beginning of period 1. The left hand side is lifetime
consumption CL, the right hand side lifetime resource consisting of lifetime earn-
ings EL and initial wealth. Provided that R < T∗, there will be retirement saving
so that the individual can consume as retired. Consumption will be smoothed over
the life cycle.
Let us add the following assumptions: Suppose that the interest and time pref-
erence rates are zero, that initial wealth is zero, and that annual earnings are con-
stant during the individual’s working life. The individual will choose to consume a
ﬁxed share of lifetime earnings every year. This will result in piecewise linear age-
wealth proﬁle with increasing wealth until retirement, a wealth peak at retirement,



















5The discussion is inspired by Davies and Shorrocks (1999) and Dynan et al. (2004).11
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1301
February 2011
where W is wealth and DR
i is an indicator equal to one when individual i is retired













Suppose that individuals are identical except for age. During their working life
individuals will move up in the wealth distribution both in absolute and relative
sense, as retired individuals will move down.
It is an old question in the economics literature whether rich people save more
than poor people. Dynan et al. (2004) discuss under which conditions savings rates
are the same. Savings rates provide a link between income and wealth. Suppose
that individuals have different lifetime earnings while there is no uncertainty and
there are no bequest motives. With identical savings rates for a cohort j, the wealth
of an individual belonging to the cohort will evolve according to
Wijt =Wijt−1+sjtEL
ij. (5)
The cohort speciﬁc savings rate is sjt. Consumption is proportional to lifetime
earnings for the individual either if (i) the time preference rate is constant and
equals the rate of interest or if (ii) preferences are homothetic. In the ﬁrst case
annual consumption will be same every year, in the second case annual consump-
tion will grow at the same rate every year. In addition, suppose that preferences,
length of life, and rates of interest are the same for all individuals. The ratio of
consumption to lifetime earnings at time t is the same for all individuals belonging
to cohort j. Finally, suppose that the relative differences between individuals in
annual earnings are constant over time. The savings rate at time t will then be the
same for all individuals belonging to cohort j with these assumptions. There will,
in other words, be no cross section variation at time t for those of the same age.
The savings rate might, on the other hand, vary over time (age) for a given cohort.
During their working life individuals will move up in the wealth distribution both
in absolute and relative sense. Those with higher lifetime earnings will move faster
and end up with more wealth at retirement than those with lower lifetime earnings.
Relaxingany of theseassumptions and instead introducing, for example, differ-
ences in preferences or earnings proﬁles, rates of interest, length of life, retirement
age, or introducing uncertainty and bequest motives will result in less homogeneity
across individuals in wealth accumulation.
2.3 Framework for empirical speciﬁcations
Going from these simple theoretical models to model speciﬁcations for empirical
analysis, keeping a life cycle perspective, allows for a host of possible choices that
have been discussed in the literature. See our musings above in Subsection 2.1.
Whatallmodelsmusthaveincommon, however, isthatanindividual(ahousehold)
has to obey its lifetime budget constraint (the present value of consumption cannot
exceed the present value of income receipts from all sources and initial wealth).12
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Consider the following simple equation of motion that describes wealth dy-
namics for household i between two periods t−1 and t and is implied by life cycle
accounting:





wheretherateofinterestr ispossiblyhouseholdspeciﬁc, Θisthetaxliability, itself
a function of tax code parameters such as an exemption level X and (marginal) tax
rates τ. Further, let Trpu and Trpr denote public and private transfers.
Equation (6) is formulated for the case that there is a single asset available, but
can be rewritten to allow for wealth composition and returns that are speciﬁc to
portfolio items. The rate of interest r may then be interpreted as a price-index-type
of average return. It may be household speciﬁc since portfolio compositions are
choices that reﬂect, among others, household risk attitudes. Conditional on income
components and consumption, the equation (6) is autoregressive inW.
This is about the only prediction that we can generate without being more spe-
ciﬁc in terms of modeling income processes and a utility function (and implied
consumption demand). The equation is a basic accounting relation and does not
generate by itself additional insights in terms of economic behavior coming from
optimization, preferences, income paths, and various shocks. Clearly, income and
consumption dynamics will determine wealth dynamics, and hence, not only un-
observables such as risk attitudes, time preference rates and habits may have reper-
cussions for individual wealth trajectories, but also age patterns and productivity
shocks over time and generations in earnings.
These remarks may sufﬁce at the time being to motivate empirical work on
estimating dynamic equations like (6) while allowing for substantial heterogeneity,
where possible not only entering throughC (as a ‘ﬁxed effect’ individual constant),
but also through the coefﬁcient onWt−1.
3 Data and descriptives
3.1 Data source
Our data are from the Longitudinal INdividual DAta base (LINDA), a data source
collected and maintained by Statistics Sweden.6 The source data are various ad-
ministrative data bases from government agencies that keep records on any (reg-
istered) inhabitant in the country. For instance, data from the tax authorities, the
social security administration, and from local municipalities. We have spent con-
siderable energy in trying to get at coherent deﬁnitions of variables from an array
of different variables for different years in the source data.
The data come in two sub-samples, that we want to refer to as the ‘P’ sample
(the panel sample) and the ‘F’ sample (the family sample). For the ‘P’ sample,
the data were randomly drawn in 1994 with a sample size of 300,000 households,
6Edin and Fredriksson (2000) presents the data base.13
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comprising almost 700,000 individuals. A household in the data set is a group of
people treated as a taxable unit. For the vast majority of cases, this coincides with a
residential household or a family. All members of these 1994 households were then
followed through time, backwards until 1968, and assigned the same household
number as the 1994 one if they were members of that same tax household in the
respective year.
For those members who joined the 1994 households in other years, a different
householdnumberwasassignedbeforejoining. Thedataalsotracksthose‘joining’
members through time when they are not member of a 1994 household. Likewise,
the data were extended beyond 1994 until 1999, using a similar sampling scheme.
This implies that the change in the number of households and individuals is closely
following the development of the entire residential population in the country for the
period 1968 through 1999.
The ‘F’ sample is available to us from 1991 until 2005. The sampling unit
here is a ‘family’ that is, persons living at the same address. Since there may be
various sub-households within a ‘family’ that are treated as separate taxable units,
and since members of the same tax households may live at different addresses, it
may be that the deﬁnitions of ‘households’ in the ‘P’ sample and of ‘families’ in
the ‘F’ sample do not coincide. On average, a ‘family’ is slightly larger than a
‘household’.7
The administrative nature of the data implies that there is no panel data attrition
as is known from survey data. Theoretically, a person can leave the sample by
emigration or death (and only in a few cases where records could not be traced in
the source data bases). Persons enter by birth or by, say, marrying into an existing
unit.
Following individuals over a time span of nearly 40 years inevitably implies
that they live in different households of different composition at different stages of
their life cycle. For instance, an individual might be born in household number 1,
then complete school and start working and be separately taxable, so be assigned
to household number 2, then marry, have children on their own, and subsequently
divorce, upon which again a new household number 3 is assigned. The implication
is that there are many ‘households’ that are linked on an individual level since the
same person is in household 1 in one year and in household 2 or 3 in another year.
We aim to remove split-off households. For this, we ﬁrst create a new super-
household identiﬁer that groups all individuals that ever were in a household that
shared at least one member in anyone year. Within such a super-household, we
7Table A.1 in Appendix A ﬁlls in on the relative differences. It shows that the number of house-
holds virtually equals the number of families in any year of overlap, but that, on average, families
are about 15 percent larger than tax households. Since in two thirds of all cases the same individuals
form both a household and a family in any given year, and close to 99 percent of all individuals that
are in the household data are also in the family data, we aim to combine both data sets and work,
in what follows, with the smaller deﬁnition of ‘tax households’. One large difference between the
series occurs at the point in time when children of age 18 and above earn their own incomes and own
their own wealth and are thus separately from their parental household liable to tax.14
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select that household that ranks highest in average size and participation within the
‘P’ sample. We call this the ‘core’ household.
For the ‘F’ sample we create artiﬁcial units from the recorded families by trac-
ing the existing and joining members of a 1999 core household that share a family
identiﬁer. We refer to these also as core households. Our subsequent analysis shall
only consider core households.
The dependent variable we use is annual taxable net wealth at the household
level. The tax base was a comprehensive measure of household net wealth (in-
cluding real assets and ﬁnancial assets minus debts). Taxable wealth did, however,
not include pension wealth in the sense that the value of future public and occu-
pational pensions were not included neither were savings in tax deferred pension
savings accounts. Appendix B reports more details about the Swedish wealth tax.
The set of control variables we have at our disposal is quite limited, but we
do have important demographics such as age of head of household, sex, family
composition and marital status. We have not yet included education but will do so
in the future.8 We can condition on ﬁxed effects, however, and that will remedy
some of the shortcomings of the data.
3.2 Descriptives
Shares. Table 1 reports the percentage share of wealth tax paying households in
Sweden 1968–2005. It is clear that we have information for the ﬁve top percent
for most years, but complete data for the whole period are only available for the
three top percent. The design of the system for taxing wealth has varied during
the period, for instance concerning tax rates and exemption levels. Many more
households paid wealth taxes during the 1980s and the second half of the 1990s.
Almost 16 percent of the households paid the wealth tax at least once during the
period. More than a third of the households that we can continuously observe
1968–2005 paid wealth taxes some time during the period.
Paying wealth tax or not is one of the possible distinctions between states that
can be made for these data. Another possible distinction is between different per-
centiles of the wealth distribution. As mentioned above, there is only complete
information over time for the top three percent of the wealth distribution. We will
use the distinction between belonging to the top three percent or not. We can also
study the ﬂows in to and out the top three percent (across the 97th percentile, P97)
and the ﬂows within the top three percent (across P98 and P99).
Instead of this relative measure, we can also compute an absolute real measure.
This will give a related but different distinction. The highest real exemption level,
deﬁned as the nominal exemption level in relation to nominal GDP per capita,
during the period was the one in 1970. The real value was ≈ SEK2010 1.5 million.
This corresponds to EUR 160,000 and USD 210,000.
8We do not observe other variables of interest, such as labor market status, occupation, health,
and so on.15
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Table 1: Percentage of households paying wealth tax, 1968–2005
year tax payer year tax payer year tax payer year tax payer
1968 6.22 1978 5.57 1988 11.91 1998 10.56
1969 6.59 1979 5.94 1989 13.09 1999 11.80
1970 4.12 1980 6.66 1990 5.44 2000 11.23
1971 5.13 1981 4.98 1991 5.96 2001 7.58
1972 5.58 1982 5.63 1992 6.94 2002 4.19
1973 5.95 1983 11.71 1993 8.13 2003 5.13
1974 3.64 1984 6.95 1994 6.69 2004 5.22
1975 5.79 1985 8.12 1995 7.28 2005 3.42
1976 6.15 1986 10.16 1996 7.94
1977 6.48 1987 10.14 1997 9.82
share ever paying wealth tax, 1968–2005 15.76
share ever paying wealth tax, those observed every year 1968–2005 34.05
Source: Linda, 1968–2005, full core sample.
We have information on all fortunes above this real wealth threshold during
the whole period. We will use the metaphor millionaires to refer to the households
above this threshold. The ﬂows of becoming a millionaire and stopping being one
can also be studied.
Figure 1 reports how the share of millionaires has evolved during the period.
The share of household above the real wealth threshold that we have imposed
showed a decreasing trend until 1980. Since then the trend has been reversed,
an increasing share of the households is above the real wealth threshold. The share
above P97 is not exactly three percent when comparing two adjacent years as the
panel is not balanced. The ﬁgure also shows the share paying wealth tax.
Flows and durations. Table 2 reports transitions during the period 1968–2005.
The left hand panel shows ﬂows into and out of the top three percent of the dis-
tribution. The right hand panel reports transitions to wealth above the real wealth
threshold and transitions in the reverse direction. From now on, we study transi-
tions between two discrete states: being in the top three percent (state 1), and not
being in the top percent (state 0). Alternatively, we consider being or not being a
millionaire.
There is some variation over time in the inﬂow rates to the top three percent.
This might be attributable to macroeconomic shocks and asset price changes, for
instance. Most years the inﬂow rate is around 0.5 percent while outﬂow rates are
in the range 15–20 percent. Obviously, inﬂow and outﬂow rates are by deﬁnition
highly correlated in this case.
Turning to the second distinction, there is more variation in the inﬂow into
being a millionaire than the inﬂow to the top three percent. This inﬂow rate is in
the range 0.2–1.5 percent while the outﬂow rate is in the range 10–30 percent.
Mobility is closely related to duration, low mobility implies long duration. Our
data give long uninterrupted accounts of wealth status. Most of our wealth spells16
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Figure 1: Shares being millionaires and paying wealth tax, 1968–2005, percent17
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Table 2: Transitions over time, 1968–2005
in top 3% of wealth distribution above highest exemption threshold
between inﬂow,% base outﬂow,% base inﬂow,% base outﬂow,% base
annual 0.60 6,915,775 17.70 214,116 0.65 6,900,218 19.17 229,673
1968–2005
1968–1969 0.48 178,541 11.68 5,558 0.54 175,927 14.73 8,172
1969–1970 0.75 179,598 21.01 5,655 1.12 177,524 19.60 7,729
1970–1971 0.52 184,913 16.41 5,815 0.88 182,524 12.15 8,204
1971–1972 0.34 192,458 9.79 6,019 0.37 189,342 13.99 9,135
1972–1973 0.37 195,112 10.75 6,092 0.32 192,641 16.22 8,563
1973–1974 0.48 197,470 13.26 6,160 0.23 195,851 24.26 7,779
1974–1975 0.67 200,588 18.59 6,251 1.09 200,525 10.99 6,314
1975–1976 0.43 203,477 11.95 6,377 0.25 202,098 22.14 7,756
1976–1977 0.44 205,799 12.83 6,461 0.25 205,748 19.61 6,512
1977–1978 1.11 207,463 33.76 6,436 0.19 208,224 49.83 5,675
1978–1979 0.57 208,582 16.40 6,476 0.15 211,860 28.14 3,198
1979–1980 0.58 209,917 16.62 6,511 0.16 213,833 24.66 2,595
1980–1981 1.07 210,231 32.82 6,535 1.99 214,513 7.10 2,253
1981–1982 0.53 207,752 15.00 6,527 0.39 208,014 19.81 6,265
1982–1983 0.72 210,992 22.31 6,593 0.66 211,809 21.50 5,776
1983–1984 0.51 208,702 14.98 6,480 0.19 209,398 29.82 5,784
1984–1985 0.50 206,636 14.35 6,398 0.35 208,687 15.37 4,347
1985–1986 0.59 203,436 17.53 6,320 0.58 205,476 12.99 4,280
1986–1987 0.66 200,495 20.03 6,240 0.24 201,948 33.28 4,787
1987–1988 0.66 195,562 17.92 5,909 0.57 198,038 14.94 3,433
1988–1989 0.58 190,812 16.78 5,810 0.37 192,806 18.89 3,816
1989–1990 0.95 188,650 28.92 5,709 0.96 190,671 19.60 3,688
1990–1991 0.65 186,731 21.79 5,792 0.60 187,774 20.70 4,749
1991–1992 0.63 185,068 18.97 5,756 0.78 185,942 15.40 4,882
1992–1993 0.58 182,199 15.74 5,678 1.12 182,444 8.01 5,433
1993–1994 0.67 182,948 19.61 5,712 0.51 181,767 25.90 6,893
1994–1995 0.48 181,912 14.62 5,672 0.51 181,702 14.21 5,882
1995–1996 0.59 179,178 18.25 5,600 1.80 178,922 6.80 5,856
1996–1997 0.49 173,135 15.70 5,464 0.88 170,172 14.60 8,427
1997–1998 0.39 170,073 12.50 5,326 0.65 166,895 10.65 8,504
1998–1999 0.65 137,789 13.09 4,040 1.47 135,162 7.51 6,667
1999–2000 0.48 150,606 13.87 4,643 0.40 146,590 21.35 8,659
2000–2001 0.66 151,058 17.93 4,535 1.38 148,502 12.37 7,091
2001–2002 0.62 150,927 19.41 4,554 0.43 147,520 32.89 7,961
2002–2003 0.45 152,080 17.44 4,736 1.28 150,671 9.59 6,145
2003–2004 0.40 153,579 12.22 4,781 0.71 150,632 10.88 7,728
2004–2005 0.83 154,327 24.65 4,778 0.26 151,205 47.11 7,900
Source: Linda, 1968-2005, full core sample.18
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are not censored, there are also repeated spells for some households. But there are
censored spells in the beginning and the end of the period. Transitions out of the
wealthy states may be because wealth has fallen below cutoff levels, but it may
also be because of death or emigration.
Starting from a life cycle model perspective, we would expect it to be more
likely to observe people above the cutoffs when they are in their 50s and 60s and
until they retire. Transitions in to paying wealth tax, in to the top three percent, or
in to becoming a millionaire would then be more likely when people accumulate
wealth, while transitions in the other direction would be more likely when people
have retired.
The average outﬂow rate from the top three percent of 17.0 suggests an average
duration in the top three percent of 5.6 years. Average duration is often referred to
as mean exit time (MET) in the mobility literature. The average outﬂow and inﬂow
rates together imply a long run top three percent share of 3.3 percent. The actual
average top three percent share is 3.05 percent.
The average outﬂow rate from being a millionaire of 19.17 suggests an average
duration as millionaire of 5.2 years. The average outﬂow and inﬂow rates together
imply a long run millionaire share of 3.3 percent. The actual average millionaire
share is about the same.
While Table 2 is illustrative on average transition probabilities it masks hetero-
geneity in wealth transitions. Table 3 provides examples of transition paths and
associated counts. The sequence 01001 means the household is in state 0 in year
1, in state 1 in year 2, back in state 0 in years 3 and 4, and in state 1 again in
year 5. This households records 3 transitions. Since we have 38 years of data, the
sequences are all of length 38 and start in 1968. A dot signiﬁes a missing value.
We only display sample paths of those that were continuously observed without
gaps (89 percent of all cases). We only display the ﬁve most frequent patterns for
a given number of transitions.19
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The Table suggests the following: (i) most households do not experience any
transition, and only a tiny fraction are always rich; (ii) conditional on any move-
ments, the number of transitions is typically small for a given individual; (iii) tran-
sitions into the higher wealth ranges occur in the second half of a series, pointing
possibly to the importance of age effects.
Table 3 can only give a few (selective) examples (we record more than 15,000
different patterns in the data), so we look at summary measures of mobility next.
Mobility. An often used summary measure in the previous literature on wealth






where N is the number of groups and tr(P) is the trace of the N ∗N transition
matrix P. The range of S is [0,N/(N−1)]. A higher S indicates a higher degree of
mobility.
In our case, we can study four groups, each of the three top percent and those
below P97 taken together. Using the average transitions rates of our data, the
Shorrocks’ measure is 0.386. This cannot, however, be compared to previous mea-
sures of wealth mobility in Sweden as we here only measure mobility for the top
percent. The strength of our data is many observations for each household. We can,
therefore, calculate a time series for annual wealth mobility for almost 40 years us-
ing the Shorrocks’ measure.
Figure 2 shows how wealth mobility has evolved during the studied period.
The annual Shorrocks’ measures vary a lot. The ﬁgure, therefore, also includes
a ﬁve year moving average. The ﬁgure suggests that wealth mobility increased
during the 1970s. Wealth mobility was stable until the mid 1990s. During the last
ten years the trend in wealth mobility was decreasing.
Stability. It is also possible to study wealth stability over time. Figure 3 shows
the shares of household in the top three percent, respectively, that have stayed in
between the percentiles where they were in the previous year. About 80 percent
of the households in the top percent remained there the following year. The cor-
responding number for the next percent is lower. On average about 60 percent of
the households between P98 and P99 remained there the following year. Stability
is lower if we turn to the next percent. Slightly less than half of the households
between P97 and P98 remained there the following year.
These descriptive facts certainly tell a story about how mobility in the top per-
cent of the Swedish wealth distribution has developed during the period 1968–
2005. But we have far from used all the possibilities that our panel data offer. This
will be the objective of the following section.
9Some refer to the measure as Shorrocks’ MET as it is a function of mean exit time from a group.21
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Figure 3: Wealth stability, 1968–2005, percent22
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4 Econometric approach
4.1 Nonlinear dynamic ﬁxed (v random) effects panel data models
We estimate reduced form models using a dynamic speciﬁcation of binary outcome
models. To focus ideas, let us introduce some notation ﬁrst. The simplest model is
y★
it = xitβ +γyi,t−1+αi+εit (8)
where y★ denotes the latent variable (wealth), y is the observed outcome of interest
(e.g., belong to top three percent or being a millionaire), x is a matrix of observed
regressor values, α is an unobserved individual-speciﬁc, time-constant effect, and
ε captures the remaining unobserved heterogeneity (error term). As usual, i and t
index individuals (or households) and time, respectively. Coefﬁcients β and γ are
being estimated and are the main parameters of interest.
The distribution of wealth as observed in the data, is highly censored. Since it
is practically impossible to accommodate the large degree of censoring, we abstain
from any effort of modeling the continuous, but censored endogenous variable,10
and focus on the binary outcome where the observed variable y is determined by
yit = 1[y★
it > ct].
As usual, 1[A] is a binary 0/1 indicator taking the value one for the expression A
being true, and zero otherwise.
We only observe y★ when it is above the threshold. Depending on model, we
take ct to be the centile corresponding to P97 of the wealth distribution in year t,
or to be the value of wealth corresponding to what we call ‘a millionaire’.11
We shall hence estimate the probability of observing y = 1, conditional on
regressors and the past choice for y. Of interest, then, is what Browning and Carro
(2006) call ‘marginal dynamic effect’,
mit = Pr(yit = 1∣yi,t−1 = 1)−Pr(yit = 1∣yi,t−1 = 0) (9)
which can be computed with given (or estimated) values of αi, β and γ. mit tells
us the difference in the probability of observing y = 1 depending on whether the
lagged indicator is 1 or 0. The marginal dynamic effect will be zero if history does
not matter in the sense that the lagged indicator does not affect the probability.
The more important a lagged indicator of 1 rather than 0 is for the probability, the
more positive the marginal dynamic effect. Expression (9) can be computed at the
10In principle, suitable methods exist for moderately censored distributions: Bover and Arellano
(1997) and Hu (2002) are two approaches that are applicable when the lagged endogenous variable
y★
t−1 enters on the right hand side and drives dynamics, as is the case where the observability is de-
termined by data recording, as in our case. Bover and Arellano (1997) is a random effects approach,
while Hu (2002) is a ﬁxed effects approach.
11Recall that this is expressed relative to nominal-per capita-deﬂated GDP, hence the threshold
changes over time.23
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individual level, and will allow us to show the heterogeneity associated with wealth
dynamics in the data.
The heterogeneity term αi helps us take into account time-ﬁxed characteristics
that determine the outcome but are unobserved to the analyst. In the context of our
reduced-form wealth equation (that may be consistent with an equation of motion
describing wealth dynamics resulting from utility maximization), one might think
of preference and technological parameters that determine consumption choices
(among which, prominently, the rate of time preference and the degree of risk
aversion) and the process of income generation (such as worker skills, occupational
trajectories and income growth parameters), both of which inﬂuence the evolution
of wealth.
There are two principal ways of modeling αi: as a ﬁxed effect and as a ran-
dom effect. For a random effects approach, the speciﬁcation will need to include
additional distributional parameters that have to be estimated. For the ﬁxed effects
approach, a large number of constants has to be estimated, but this can be done
without distributional restrictions.12
In a ﬁxed effects setting, the inclusion of αi as individual dummy variables in
maximum likelihood estimation has been viewed as causing an incidental parame-
ter problem (Neyman and Scott, 1948). The main issue is that parameter estimates
of coefﬁcients of explanatory variables, such as β but also γ, that are being jointly
estimated with the ﬁxed effects constants αi need not be consistent when T is ﬁxed.
After all, the estimate of an individual αi depends on the data series {yit,xit}t=1,...,Ti
available for individual i only, and hence the source of the problem is that Ti ∕→ ∞.
Even if N → ∞, the addition of individuals will not provide any new information
that can be used to estimate a particular αi.
The form of the resulting asymptotic bias in the estimates of β and γ can be
characterized further with a speciﬁcation of the distribution of ε giving rise to a
particular probability model. Without further adjustments, however, ﬁnite-T esti-
mation of a ﬁxed effects probit model as we pursue in this paper may not allow
valid inference. See Heckman (1981).
Some well-known estimators that avoid the problem are the linear ﬁxed effects
model estimated after transforming the data into deviations from individual means,
or the nonlinear ﬁxed effects logit model (or, conditional logit) that conditions the
likelihood contribution of an individual on a sufﬁcient statistic for the ﬁxed effect.
Both approaches are unavailable in the probit case due to functional form, and for
our purposes suffer from the problem that estimates for αi are likewise unavailable,
precluding calculation of interesting magnitudes such as (9).
A vivid recent econometric literature investigates possibilities for estimating
parameters of nonlinear (dynamic) panel data models when T is ﬁnite (and typ-
ically small in applications). See the overview in Arellano and Hahn (2007) for
12A logit speciﬁcation for ε allows treating αi entirely as ‘nuisance’ parameter such that the pa-
rameters of interest can be identiﬁed without recourse to estimates of αi. Only in the special case of
two time periods, however, is it possible to recover αi from a closed-form solution of the ﬁrst order
condition of the maximum likelihood problem (‘concentrating out’) and to calculate (9).24
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a synthesis of available approaches, some of which employ maximum likelihood
estimates of β (and γ). One avenue relies on analytical bias reduction (Fernandez-
Val, 2009; Browning and Carro, 2006; Hahn and Kuersteiner, 2004), another one
on numerical jackknife methods (Hahn and Newey, 2004; Dhaene et al., 2006).
We shall in this paper, however, not employ any such methods, and instead
rely on the fact that our data allow observation of long individual time series (Ti ≥
30), i.e., we assume that our ﬁxed effects estimates of β and γ are not biased,
and that the available series are long enough.13 The consensus in the theoretical
literature appears to be that the problem ‘disappears’ for practical purposes with T
‘not small’. We explore sensitivity of our estimates by analyzing subsamples with
varying lengths of T, however.
We estimate an individual dummy variable probit model, assuming an i.i.d.
standard normal distribution for εit. Beyond independence, there are no distribu-
tional assumptions concerning αi, and, in particular, they can be freely correlated
with the xit.
We have previously also considered the alternative of estimating a random ef-
fects model. Random effects models have the advantage of being able to generate
estimates that are unbiased in the face of small T. They have obvious drawbacks,
however. First, and foremost, one needs to assume orthogonality between αi and
xit. This assumption is problematic in our case as we have only a very limited set
of regressors that we can control for. It is likely that there will be a correlation
between included regressors and the composite error αi +εit. Second, one needs
to specify the functional form of the distribution of the individual heterogeneity.
Third, calculation of (9) requires values of αi, and a random effects approach only
allows calculation of an expected marginal effect (by integrating out over the esti-
mated distribution of αi).
The selection of the data brought about by the requirements for sufﬁcient vari-
ation in the dependent variable in order to be able to estimate our dynamic models
now implies that we study a sample of movers that cross a threshold. These are,
of course, not average people. These people do pay wealth taxes at some stage
during their life. Since we are interested in the individual dynamics, we hence
focus the discussion on how various approaches to modeling the dynamics, includ-
ing allowing for explicit heterogeneity, affects the estimates generated from that
sample. We document below how the various choices affect the conclusion, but it
should be borne in mind that only a small number of individual households crosses
the relevant threshold, and in particular in such a way that allows identifying dy-
namic coefﬁcients. Thus, our mobility measure is zero for those that never get
rich. Conditional on the sample that we use, however, we show that traditional dy-
namicmodelsunderestimatewealthmobility. Inaddition, weshallnotbecapturing
13An open question is to what extent bias correction methods are applicable to the case of models
with heterogeneous AR coefﬁcients, as we emphasize below is insightful for the present analysis.
Most methods apply to the case of a single, common, AR parameter. Browning and Carro (2006)’s
bias corrected estimator is speciﬁcally designed for the heterogeneous case, but cannot accommodate
covariates.25
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wealth mobility conﬁned to movements entirely below or above the thresholds.
4.2 Relaxing homogeneous individual effects
There are three extensions we wish to consider. First, a simple interaction between
thelaggedendogenousdummyvariableandtheregressormatrixdeliversadditional
ﬂexibility, as the implied marginal effect now depends on regressor values:
y★
it = xitβ +(yi,t−1zit)γ +αi+εit. (10)
Typically, z = x, and (10) nests (8) if z is a vector of 1’s. A simple Wald or LR test
can be used to establish whether (10) is a statistically signiﬁcant improvement over
(8). In terms of interpreting the estimated equation as a dynamic wealth accumula-
tion equation, factors that are individual-speciﬁc and impact on the return to wealth
(e.g., characteristics that would inﬂuence the portfolio composition of household
wealth) may be relevant, but also pure (macroeconomic) time-effects (asset price
movements, for instance, that imply capital gains or losses).
Second, we can follow Browning and Carro (2006) and propose the extension
y★
it = xitβ +γiyi,t−1+αi+εit (11)
As those authors show, the simpler speciﬁcation (8) implies heterogenous marginal
dynamic effects despite a constant parameter γ. The added ﬂexibility in (11) al-
lows, on the other hand, individual dynamics and a much more insightful analy-
sis of heterogeneous wealth dynamics, certainly under a ‘ﬁxed effects’ paradigm.
Also, the marginal effects distribution M is likely to be affected, as (11) allows it
essentially to be ‘nonparametric’ while under (8) (or (10)) M is constrained by the
probit functional form.
Third, we can consider more lags than in (11), and in theory apply the method-
ology to an AR(p) process. However, there are severe data limitation to be kept
in mind when estimating general processes. Numerical identiﬁcation requires the
number of transitions observed per individual to increase with p, and, in addition,
to have variation in yt conditional on yt−1 at the individual level. We have suc-
ceeded to estimate at most AR(2) models with the data at hand.
Technically, the probit model thus far considered can be estimated with entirely
standard probit software, as available in any estimation package. The only consid-
eration is the fact that the regressor matrix and the variance-covariance matrix (and
Hessians) are very large indeed when individual dummies are used to estimate the
parameters. This will easily exhaust available computing facilities.
We follow Greene (2004) and program a routine that allows inclusion of liter-
ally thousands of dummy variables in estimation without having to handle (com-
pute, store, invert) associated large sparse matrices. Appendix C explains the de-
tails of the procedure for the generalization where individual processes are of the
AR(p) type.
The AR(p) structure is a very ﬂexible way of modeling individual dynamics,
certainly compared to what else has been done in the relevant literature. Yet, this26
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modeling approach does not allow for moving average components, as would be
the case with more general models (of the ARMA(p,q) type). Extending the cur-
rent methodology based on maximum likelihood to such general error structures
appears practically infeasible, however.14
4.3 Interpreting heterogeneity
Browning and Carro (2007) warn that ‘heterogeneity is too important to be left to
the statisticians’. While it is conceptually easy to add in heterogeneity in param-
eters as we do in this paper, the question is, whether there is much of an inter-
pretation to these parameters, or whether they are, as often, viewed as nuisance
parameters that one may want to control for, but are not of prime interest in them-
selves.
Since our focus is on wealth mobility, we are in a position, however, to give the
estimated marginal dynamic effect (9), obtained from an estimate of γ, meaningful
interpretation. In particular, Shorrocks’ measure of mobility (7), that is based on
the off-diagonal elements of the transition matrix, is directly linked to this magni-
tude.
Denote by Pij= Pr(yt = j∣yt−1 = i) the elements of the transition matrix. For
binary outcome transitions (i, j = 0,1;N = 2), S equals
S = 1−P00+1−P11
The marginal dynamic effect that we estimate equals m = P11 −P01. With P00 +
P01 = 1, we have S = 1−m.
5 Empirical evidence
5.1 Data and sample selection
We study two separate models. The ﬁrst dependent variable of interest is ‘being in
the top three percent’ of the wealth distribution, which is a year-speciﬁc indicator
that has value one if the household belongs to the wealthiest three percent in any
given year, using all available observations. The second dependent variable is a
year-speciﬁc indicator taking the value one if the household has real wealth above
the real wealth threshold, i.e., the household is a ‘millionaire’.
We start with the full core sample, as described earlier, at the household level.
All heads of household are 18 and above. There are more than 400,000 different
14Some attempts to explore alternative avenues for simpler, univariate time series data have been
undertaken: Poirier and Ruud (1988) consider estimation of ARMA probit models (and other general
error structures) by what they call generalized conditional moment estimation, a variant of GMM.
Gourierouxetal.(1984)proposearelatedmethod. Asonealternative, Browningetal.(2009)propose
a simulated minimum distance (indirect inference) estimator applied to income dynamics. This is
computationally intensive, however, unlike our approach which is very fast.27
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households and more than 7.5 million observations. We only select those house-
holds where the identity of the head of household does not change over time, to
avoid problems in interpreting coefﬁcients. This leaves about 350,000 households.
Not doing so would introduce additional variation in the regressor values that are
taken to be head-of-household characteristics.15
We further throw out observations with missing values in regressors, and re-
move all households that never experience any transitions in the dependent vari-




1950. There are about 6,000 such households. This is to make sure that we have
a reasonably large, but also reasonably homogeneous cohort that entered the labor
market towards the beginning of the observation period, and has not yet retired by
the end of it (i.e., these heads of households are between 18 and 28 in 1968 and
between 55 and 65 in 2005). Retirement brings about the issue of accounting for
wealth decumulation, and perhaps it is a good idea to ﬁrst leave this out of the
picture.
We then select only those who have at least 30 observations over time, so as to
be reasonably sure that the ﬁxed effects approach is okay. There are about 2,000
households left.
We further need to have enough variation in the dependent variable and its lag
in order to estimate heterogeneous AR models as in (11). This AR(1) speciﬁcation
will be our baseline model. We are left with 980 households, good for almost
34,000 observations across all years, when studying transitions into and out of the
top three percent. The sample for transitions into and out of being a millionaire is
a bit larger – 1,303 households and more than 45,000 observations.
We model the probability of being in the top of the distribution and being a
millionaire as functions of the following groups of covariates that we have at our
disposal:
∙ head-of-household characteristics; age, decade of birth cohort, gender, and
marital status
∙ household demographics; number of children in different age ranges, and
household size
∙ macroeconomic factors; real GDP growth including an interaction with an
indicator for negative growth; growth in the stock market index
∙ wealth tax policy parameters: exemption levels depending on family com-
position, and the marginal tax rate applicable to the ﬁrst tax bracket
15The head of household is selected as follows: each person has a person speciﬁc identiﬁer and a
household identiﬁer. The data come in such a format that the household identiﬁer equals the person
identiﬁer of one of its members. We take that particular member to be head of household.28
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Since the underlying model takes into account unobserved heterogeneity by
means of ﬁxed effects, we, as it were, remove cohort effects and gender differences
without controlling for them by means of variables. We presently do not observe
the head of household’s education, but such effects would also be mainly accounted
for in the ﬁxed effects estimates.16
We have, without presenting them here, estimated static models such as ﬁxed
and random effects logit models, but also static versions of the ﬁxed effects probit
model. From these estimates we learn two things: ﬁrst, a standard Hausman spec-
iﬁcation test clearly rejects the random effects speciﬁcation. This is one important
reason to prefer the ﬁxed effects approach. Second, we ﬁnd in fact very similar
parameter estimates between the conditional logit model and the dummy variable
probit (except for the fact that the scale is different). This is no evidence for the
absence of a bias in the estimated γ coefﬁcient, but at least reassuring of no major
impacts of the ancillary parameter estimates on the βs.
Presently we abstain from a detailed discussion of parameter estimates but fo-
cus on distributions of heterogeneous parameters.
We now present a number of empirical models that were estimated using the
data. They enable us to keep things constant that implicitly varied in the pictures
and table discussed before. These are all reduced form models, but they may be
interesting in their own right.
5.2 Belong to the top three percent
We now turn to simple dynamic speciﬁcations where we have put in the lagged
value of being in the top three percent as regressor. The model is that of equation
(8), with individual intercepts and and a common AR(1)-parameter. Parameter
estimates are in the ﬁrst column in Table 4.
We start with model (8). The overall ﬁt of the model is relatively good, as
calculated from weighted prediction/realization tables (we predict Pr(xitβ +ηi)
and assign the value of 1 if larger than 0.5, and subsequently calculate a prediction
score). The value is 56.3 percent.
Compared to a static model estimated on the same sample (not displayed), the
dynamic speciﬁcation is a substantial improvement. The LR-test statistic is 6,626.0
at 1 degree of freedom.
The lagged endogenous variable is, therefore, statistically very important, but
a more interesting magnitude to look at from an economic point of view is the im-
plied marginal dynamic effect (9), since it characterizes individual wealth mobil-
ity. This marginal dynamic effect is household-speciﬁc since it is predicted from
Φ(¯ xiβ +γyi,t−1 +ηi), i.e., even though γ is constant, (and characteristics xit are
evaluated at individual time-means ¯ xi that vary across individuals), the probability
changes between individuals due to the household speciﬁc constant ηi.
Figure 4 shows the pdf of these marginal dynamic effects. It is clear that there
16Income is not readily available at the moment, but we aspire to construct income series as well.29
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Table 4: Dynamic ﬁxed effects probit models for being in the top 3% of the wealth
distribution
single AR(1) parameter AR(1) parameter heterogeneous AR(1)
interacted with regressors parameters
coefﬁ- standard coefﬁ- standard coefﬁ- standard
cient error cient error cient error
lagged endogenous 1.682815 .0214667*** 7.340641 2.580276***
age -.159051 .0748251** -.2482446 .0971946** -.1997144 .0821888**
age2/10 .0527786 .0169562*** .0801583 .0221066*** .0641682 .0186399***
age3/100 -.0043122 .0012401*** -.0067292 .0016245*** -.0052163 .0013644***
cohabiting .0323854 .2051512 -.0631404 .2535309 -.0330839 .2260541
widow/er -.0710483 .1172976 -.0927725 .1440923 -.1123935 .1257597
divorcee .4490564 .1802275** .5310524 .2060472*** .5180835 .1926504***
single -.0014392 .1301047 .0121976 .1573418 .0125043 .1399965
lone parent .484653 .1231247*** .4064372 .1478057*** .4659247 .1363659***
#kids<18 -.2161894 .1319195 -.2754027 .1633705* -.1820396 .1420796
HH size .4132108 .1017754*** .3601143 .1285108*** .4249284 .1083338***
#kids × age -.0016641 .0019025 .000972 .0022904 -.0024679 .0020744
real GDP growth -.0285804 .0106788*** -.0670244 .0136515*** -.0325305 .0111584***
(0/1) growth < 0 .0973162 .0613178 .1386106 .071006* .1063557 .0636562*
real GDP gr if <0 .1187836 .0383199*** .2871058 .0456194*** .1358842 .0398084***
growth stock mkt index .108984 .0506212 .0240268 .0645019 .1330744 .053012**
marginal tax rate .0759754 .0419888* .1166482 .0507147** .0774579 .0452411*
(indiv.) exemp. level .0123594 .0467189 .1110421 .0584277* .0140471 .0491688








lone parent .2435017 .2455084
#kids<18 .3441656 .2748643
HH size .1994754 .2104067
#kids × age -.0120686 .0037633***
real GDP growth .1163228 .0232157***
(0/1) growth < 0 -.2192608 .1464162
real GDP gr if <0 -.5423698 .0920906***
growth stock mkt index .124521 .1095409
marginal tax rate -.0296074 .1344551
(indiv.) exemp. level -.2463421 .0987869***
log-likelihood -10307.47 -10167.15 -9867.90
Number of obs = 33787 Number of HH = 980 Number of times per HH = 31-38
is a large concentration at the upper values. The AR-effects appear to be rather
large at 0.25–0.6 for most observations.
The ﬂexibility of the model can be enhanced by considering speciﬁcation (10).
Parameter estimates are in the second column of Table 4. A LR test again suggests
a substantial improvement. The implied marginal dynamic effect distribution is,
however, not so much affected, as can be gleaned from Figure 5.
We now turn to estimates from a more ﬂexible speciﬁcation. The model is
(11), with individual intercepts and AR(1)-parameters. Parameter estimates are in
the third column in Table 4. Comparison with the restricted model from above30
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Figure 5: PDF of predicted marginal dynamic effect, FE probit, common interacted
AR parameter31
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Figure 6: PDF of Predicted Marginal Dynamic Effect, FE Probit, individual AR
parameter
suggests that there are some, but no dramatic changes in coefﬁcient estimates. The
ﬂexible model is also a statistical improvement over (8) according to an LR test,
even though the overall ﬁt is not much improved (the prediction score changes to
56.8 percent).
Note that the differences between these three speciﬁcations in terms of coef-
ﬁcient estimates of the included regressor variables is, actually, minor. The age
function does display a life-cycle pattern with strong accumulation in the mid-age
range, slowingdownuntilshortlybeforeretirementage. Weabstainfromadetailed
discussion of other parameters at the moment.
Many of the 980 additional AR(1) parameters are statistically signiﬁcant; 440
have a signiﬁcance level of 1 percent or lower, 227 of between 1 and 5 percent, and
another 75 of between 5 and 10 percent. The marginal effects distribution is very
different, however, compared to the restricted model, see Figure 6. In particular,
the domain of the distribution is much more spread out, and even a tiny fraction
of negative marginal effects are observed.17 That is, there is substantial individual
heterogeneity in wealth trajectories that the simpler model fails to capture.
We can, in principle, allow for more ﬂexible time series patterns by extending
the lag order of the AR model. This implies a signiﬁcant drop in observations,
however, since higher lags call for more observed transitions at the individual level.
In order not to lose so many observations, we can instead use the current sample
and estimate an AR(2) model for those individuals that have a sufﬁcient variation,
and we impose an AR(2) coefﬁcient of zero on the remaining individuals. We refer
17Unlike Figures 4 and 5, Figure 6 is based on predictions at individual regressor values, but that
as such is immaterial.32
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to this model as the ‘mixed model’.
Conducting this exercise leads to the following conclusions: the mixed model
is not a statistical improvement over the AR(1) model. There are only 18 house-
holds with an AR(2) coefﬁcient that has a signiﬁcance level of 10 percent or lower
(only 2 at 1 percent or lower). The associated likelihood ratio test also rejects
the mixed model as a statistical improvement over the AR(1) model. We, hence,
conclude that a ﬂexible AR(1) model is a good empirical description of wealth
transitions for the data at hand.
We now have a short look at the correlates of our measured heterogeneity. We
regress the estimated individual parameters on observable characteristics, plus year
of birth indicators and a gender dummy. We use time-averaged values of the other
regressors. The ﬁrst estimation reported in Table 5 asks the questions what the
correlates of the ﬁxed effects are. We do not ﬁnd many strong correlations with
regressors.
The second pair of columns in Table 5 extends the analysis to the estimated in-
dividual AR(1) parameters (γi). Looking at the coefﬁcient estimates suggests that
a few variables are correlated with individual wealth dynamics. Both household
size and gender appear important. Lastly in the third pair of columns of Table 5
we can look at the correlates of the marginal dynamic effects whose distribution
was displayed earlier. Here, cohort effects appear to play some role. In general,
however, it appears difﬁcult to ‘explain’ these individual speciﬁc parameters from
observables. This suggests that an alternative modeling strategy whereby full in-
teraction of all observables were used to capture heterogeneity would not be able
to explain as much of the variation in wealth transitions.
5.3 Be a millionaire
So far, we looked at transitions within the wealth distribution, relative to other
households. This subsection now analyzes wealth mobility in an absolute sense:
which households become ‘millionaires’?
Parameter estimates for the simple dynamic model (8) are in the ﬁrst set of
columns of Table 6. Abstaining from a detailed discussion of coefﬁcient estimates,
we conﬁne ourselves to remarking the similarity in conclusions compared to the
‘top-3%’ speciﬁcation from above, and the similarity of coefﬁcient estimates dis-
played in the Table across speciﬁcations.
We may want to note that, as before, the model is a statistical improvement
over a static model estimated on the same sample. We also ﬁnd this model to pro-
vide a good ﬁt to the data. We have calculated marginal effects, and ﬁnd, without
displaying a ﬁgure here, that the distribution resembles its counterpart for the top
three percent exercise before (Figure 4).
Similar remarks apply to the more ﬂexible model (10). Again, we end up
preferring a speciﬁcation with one individual AR(1) parameter, see the third pair
of columns of Table 6. Among the 1,303 estimated values, 349 have a signiﬁcance
level of 1 percent or lower, 351 of 1–5 percent, and 163 are signiﬁcant at a level of33
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Table 5: Correlates: Top 3%
Fixed Effects AR(1) parameters Marginal Dynamic Effects
coefﬁ- standard coefﬁ- standard coefﬁ- standard
cient error cient error cient error
age† 2.118387 3.153498 -1.050247 3.582116 .004712 1.14794
(age†)2/10 -.5240023 .7325195 .2440081 .8320821 -.0052826 .2666526
(age†)3/100 .0420609 .0565761 -.0180836 .0642658 .0009396 .0205949
cohabiting† -.3910897 .6489678 -.6514766 .7371743 -.2411752 .2362381
widow/er† -.040489 .7992894 1.322205 .9079273 .5157881 .2909583*
divorcee† -.9447946 .7997925 1.148084 .9084987 .3148 .2911414
single† -.0204594 .8616521 .8122112 .9787663 .3627672 .3136597
lone parent† -.498079 .470098 -.4379938 .5339929 -.1175987 .1711257
(#kids<18)† .4873501 .8192932 -.4284808 .93065 .0414967 .2982401
HH size† -1.14095 .6310005* 1.637889 .7167649** .4187195 .2296976*
#kids × age† .0118689 .0127949 -.0271198 .014534 -.0107593 .0046576**
(indiv.) exemp. level† 1.076342 1.02917 -.7688777 1.169053 .0187085 .3746397
female .2012335 .1190079* .4425653 .1351833*** .0825061 .0433214*
born 1941 .0000376 .0721246 .0593493 .0819276 .012235 .0262549
born 1942 -.0032152 .0758997 .1380168 .0862158 .0474163 .0276291*
born 1943 .0241302 .0811675 .0971048 .0921996 .0343098 .0295467
born 1944 -.0416399 .0847683 .1129717 .0962898 .0401895 .0308574
born 1945 .0362068 .0941263 .0995891 .1069198 .0393375 .034264
born 1946 -.0502707 .1023095 .1506672 .1162152 .0635199 .0372428*
born 1947 .0530385 .1104681 .0786957 .1254827 .0199092 .0402127
born 1948 -.0523061 .1276082 .1774652 .1449525 .0692565 .0464521
born 1949 -.0454891 .1412671 .035303 .1604679 .0185861 .0514242
born 1950 .0771499 .1956887 -.0308003 .2222864 -.0019476 .0712348
constant -28.24816 45.12558 13.71749 51.25897 -.4015446 16.42667
Adj. R2 0.1625 0.0074 0.0097
†averages over time Number of HH = 980
Note: This Table shows regression results from regressing estimated constants and AR(1) parameters as well as
marginal dynamic effects on household (average) regressors. *, **, and *** denote statistical signiﬁcance
at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.
5–10 percent.
Recall that there is a direct, inverse relation between the marginal dynamic
effect and Shorrocks’ mobility index (subsection 4.3). We may conjecture that
age and demographics are important determinants of life cycle mobility. For this
reason, we also estimated the same model without age and demographics (LR test
statisticof2,976.3at11degreesoffreedom). Figure7nowdisplaysthedistribution
of individual mobility indexes for both models. It is clear that not accounting for
demographics and age gives a very misleading picture of mobility indeed, as in
that case much of the observed life cycle mobility is attributed to the individual-
speciﬁc parameters. We would erroneously characterizethe society as substantially
less mobile.
Table 7 regresses the various individual parameters on (time-averaged) regres-
sor values. We ﬁnd a few more signiﬁcant correlates here. Dynamics correlate with
household size, marital status, and year of birth cohorts. We abstain from detailed
discussion, though.
Similar to the top three percent case, we ﬁnd also in the millionaires sample34
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Figure 7: PDF of Predicted Mobility Index, ‘Mil-
lionaires’, FE Probit, individual AR parameter
(MI(xbi)–mobility index calculated per individual and predicted from demographics
and age, MI(xbi 0)–mobility index calculated per individual without demographics or
age).35
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only a handful of observations with a signiﬁcant AR(2) parameter, once we con-
sider the appropriate extension. The AR(1) model is our preferred model also in
this case.
Table 6: Dynamic ﬁxed effects probit models for being a millionaire
single AR(1) parameter AR(1) parameter heterogeneous AR(1)
interacted with regressors parameters
coefﬁ- standard coefﬁ- standard coefﬁ- standard
cient error cient error cient error
lagged endogenous 1.542982 .0204381*** 12.81794 2.403871***
age -1.016732 .064382*** -.9576416 .0851081*** -1.180487 .0716111***
age2/10 .247407 .0146571*** .2338048 .0195058*** .2867058 .0163709***
age3/100 -.0181976 .0010733*** -.0169749 .0014392*** -.0210695 .0012028***
cohabiting .0293042 .1946713 -.0074937 .2253558 .003391 .2112389
widow/er -.0473421 .1099141 -.2188473 .1387833 -.0789471 .1183841
divorcee .3002816 .1706408* .1135587 .2076083 .3554883 .1875367*
single -.0656721 .1232698 -.1712934 .1530586 -.0900556 .1340413
lone parent .5311998 .1170961*** .6031929 .1408785*** .549723 .129328***
#kids<18 -.0115711 .1253915 -.0168296 .1602677 .0524657 .136399
HH size .445204 .0945759*** .3835701 .1230725*** .467978 .1008531***
#kids × age -.0082216 .0018199*** -.0068419 .0022401*** -.0100151 .002014***
real GDP growth -.1102544 .0099726*** -.1787547 .0131464*** -.1172893 .0105225***
(0/1) growth < 0 .0261611 .0578067 .1349433 .0644732** .0961051 .0601072
real GDP gr if <0 .2708629 .036116*** .5431842 .0415277*** .3246629 .0374685***
growth stock mkt index .1828041 .0477262*** .154156 .0620102** .2649956 .0504448***
marginal tax rate .0256652 .0442615 .1697491 .055845*** .0532411 .047151
(indiv.) exemp. level .1985484 .0429015*** .1602001 .0531052*** .1953812 .0455879***








lone parent -.1773855 .2294394
#kids<18 .2018143 .2608769
HH size .2578339 .1938057
#kids × age -.0088382 .003627**
real GDP growth .1901901 .0219909***
(0/1) growth < 0 -.7336487 .1776141***
real GDP gr if <0 -1.073245 .112499***
growth stock mkt index .028123 .104533
marginal tax rate -.4411231 .1103541***
(indiv.) exemp. level -.0540775 .0928149
log-likelihood -12184.25 -11889.69 -11565.47
Number of obs = 45066 Number of HH = 1303 Number of times per HH = 31-38
5.4 Final remark on time series dimension
We rely, as indicated, on the availability of sufﬁciently long individual time series
that are long enough as to be able to virtually ignore the incidental parameters
problem. There are no established values of T that allow a clear-cut classiﬁcation
into what may be considered ‘long’ (as opposed to ‘short’). Available Monte Carlo36
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Table 7: Correlates: Millionaires
Fixed Effects AR(1) parameters Marginal Dynamic Effects
coefﬁ- standard coefﬁ- standard coefﬁ- standard
cient error cient error cient error
age† 8.142965 3.555182** .9568186 3.849714 1.345923 1.209481
(age†)2/10 -1.933486 .8213592** -.2792609 .8894055 -.3361594 .2794283
(age†)3/100 .1513464 .0631119** .0260597 .0683405 .0276565 .0214708
cohabiting† -.7290283 .5600822 -.4781342 .6064828 -.2816312 .1905413
widow/er† -.0888734 .7888198 2.814582 .8541703*** .968578 .2683583***
divorcee† -.8222488 .7966586 2.984527 .8626586*** .900239 .2710251***
single† -.0281916 .8488197 2.736601 .919141*** .9162401 .2887704***
lone parent† -.3667024 .4603536 -.4907778 .4984921 -.1201323 .1566134
(#kids<18)† 1.002271 .8072598 -1.327649 .8741381 -.1827494 .2746316
HH size† -1.172323 .6059923* 1.643329 .6561964** .3816931 .20616*
#kids × age† .0030055 .0128408 -.0053662 .0139046 -.0038386 .0043685
(indiv.) exemp. level† .7802054 .9627951 1.800913 1.042559 .7706545 .3275451**
female .1089658 .1144269 .2005417 .1239067 .0053418 .0389283
born 1941 .0059612 .0703328 .2078861 .0761596*** .0538252 .0239274**
born 1942 -.0253665 .0741187 .1990982 .0802591** .0427885 .0252154*
born 1943 .0623988 .0790037 .2120676 .0855489** .0700402 .0268773***
born 1944 -.0262492 .0844928 .1736 .0914927* .0442154 .0287446
born 1945 -.0248961 .0935969 .1130913 .101351 .0264545 .0318419
born 1946 -.0580893 .1015184 .1551799 .1099287 .0521474 .0345368
born 1947 -.0502479 .1115674 .0401641 .1208104 -.0175432 .0379555
born 1948 -.1233472 .1273414 -.0245195 .1378912 -.0157487 .0433218
born 1949 -.100163 .1415697 .0629306 .1532982 .0015334 .0481623
born 1950 -.0719103 .1940168 .1412618 .2100904 .0294464 .066005
constant -99.97246 51.21036* -14.66973 55.45294 -19.20964 17.42188
Adj. R2 0.1567 0.0126 0.0378
†averages over time Number of HH = 1303
Note: This Table shows regression results from regressing estimated constants and AR(1) parameters as well as
marginal dynamic effects on household (average) regressors. *, **, and *** denote statistical signiﬁcance
at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.
evidence is speciﬁc to set-ups and may not carry over to our application, but we
stay far above the values typically considered for T.18 We select a sample in which
the estimated marginal dynamic effects distribution does not change appreciably
18Heckman (1981) considers T ≥ 8 reasonably long enough, but his results are questioned by
Greene (2004) whose analyses suggests values in excess of T > 16 to be needed (also see: Browning
andCarro(2007)). Attheotherextreme, BrowningandCarro(2006)feelverysafewithignoringbias
with micro data that have T ≥ 100 (weekly observations), but unfortunately, they do not report what
happens when they choose shorter panels. Even bias correction methods need ‘long enough’ series
to deliver satisfactory results; Hahn and Kuersteiner (2004) consider T = 16 ‘moderately large’;
Fernandez-Val (2009) reports T = 8 to work and considers at most T = 16; Browning and Carro
(2006) settle on T = 9.
anymore, and ﬁnd T = 30 to be a reasonable lower value.19,2037
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6 Conclusions
With increasing availability of suitable micro data, the recent economic literature
has seen a surge in interest in studying distributional issues and implications of top
incomes. In addition, there is revived interest in studies on wealth mobility.
We add to this literature the aspect of studying individual wealth mobility over
the entire working life cycle, exploiting long individual time series of household
wealth.
We use a large administrative sample from Sweden. The period under study
covers the years 1968–2005. We can track many households that are continuously
in the sample.
The wealth data are heavily censored from below, owing to the fact that their
values originate from wealth tax registers that only keep wealth records for actual
taxpayers. The wealth tax in Sweden (abolished as per 2007) was associated with
relatively high exemption levels. This leaves only a small fraction (between 3.4
and 13.1 percent) of households observed with wealth in any one cross section.
However, we capture the top of the wealth distribution, which is very important for
determining macroeconomic aggregates. And from a life cycle point of view, there
is actually a large fraction of households (34 percent) that ever pay wealth taxes at
some point during their life cycles if we condition on those that are in the sample
every year from 1968 to 2005.
Whereas the wealth information available in the tax data is restricted, we can
shed new light on the study of wealth mobility and dynamics at the individual
level. Due to heavy censoring, we conﬁne ourselves to looking at changes over
time in binary indicators. We, thus, study movements in and out of the top three
percent of the wealth distribution, and across an absolute wealth threshold that we
refer to as ‘millionaires’ (in local currency). We rely on a ﬁxed effects approach.
Owing to the comparatively large time dimension of our data, we estimate dynamic
binarychoicemodelsthatallowcalculatingaﬁxedeffectattheindividuallevel, and
importantly, that allow for estimating parameters of individual wealth dynamics.
We present evidence based on AR(1) processes. We test for and reject presence of
higher-order lags in individual time series, a feature of our study that is unique in
the empirical literature on wealth.
19FiguresA.1andA.2intheAppendixdisplaytheoutcomeofthefollowingexercise: westartwith
a sample with T = 37 (the maximum in the data, after allowing for an initial value), and randomly
eliminate time periods from individual series, successively reducing T. This heuristic approach,
while debatable (it creates gaps in individual time series that are ignored), shows a large degree of
stability in the distribution for all T ≥ 30. Only below this value, do we see ﬁrst changes. These
ﬁgures are not congruent with Figure 6 due to differences in the base sample.
20We have also estimated (8) under the restriction γ = 0, and found no large differences in param-
eter estimates of β between our ﬁxed effects probit and a conditional logit (save for differences in
scale, of course) with our choice of T.38
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We can also show that simpler speciﬁcations without accounting for the sub-
stantial heterogeneity can lead to a misleading characterization of wealth accumu-
lation behavior over the course of a households’ working life cycle. The evidence
we provide in this paper is principally informative for macroeconomic modeling
of life cycle consumption models that rely on individual heterogeneity of one form
or other to pin down unobserved parameters by way of calibrating to the cross sec-
tional wealth distribution. Sample paths of simulated models have been studied in
the literature. Empirical evidence on actual household wealth transitions over long
time spans has been lacking heretofore.39
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Appendix A Additional tables and ﬁgures
Table A.1: Total sample sizes, by sample and year
P-Sample F-Sample percentage percentage
number of number of number of number of identical common
























1991 288,044 672,857 285,102 772,253 65.0 98.1
1992 289,368 671,742 286,860 777,973 64.4 98.2
1993 291,068 696,753 289,022 784,065 67.6 98.4
1994 293,130 698,601 291,396 790,005 67.9 98.7
1995 294,086 698,513 292,396 790,252 67.9 98.7
1996 299,492 701,037 297,832 793,016 68.6 98.8
1997 300,721 679,720 298,479 787,294 67.0 98.8
1998 301,085 680,108 299,053 784,865 67.5 98.8




























Figure A.1: Distribution of Marginal Effects, ‘Top 3%’, Varying T


















Figure A.2: Distribution of Marginal Effects, ‘Millionaires’, Varying T
(e.g. MEI32–marginal effect, calculated per individual, T = 32).44
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Appendix B The Swedish wealth tax
The Swedish wealth tax in its modern form was introduced in 1948 when there
was an extensive tax reform. It has never been a major source of government
revenue. The main arguments for it has been equity and redistribution. The wealth
tax was repealed from 2007 by the newly elected right-wing government.21 The tax
remains a hot political topic, the Social Democrats say that they will reintroduce
the tax if they regain power in the 2010 parliamentary election.
The main features of the wealth tax were unchanged over the main observation
period, 1968–2005. It differed from other taxes in that it was levied at the house-
hold level and not individual level as the other personal taxes are. This was, in
other words, the only example when the household, and not the individual or the
ﬁrm, was the unit of taxation.22
The net wealth of the adult members of the household was added together with
the net wealth of the minor children of the household. The tax base was a compre-
hensive measure of household net wealth (including real assets and ﬁnancial assets
minus debts).23 Household tax liability was subsequently individualized according
to the net wealth share of the individual within the household.
Taxable wealth did not include pension wealth in the sense that the value of
future public and occupational pensions were not included neither were savings
in tax deferred pension savings accounts. The values of cars, boats, art, and life
insurance were not included. In addition there was far from complete coverage of
assets abroad.
The wealth tax system was conceptually simple. There was a generous exemp-
tion level, exempting, on average, more than 90–95 percent of all households from
paying any taxes at all. We refer to this as tax bracket zero with a marginal tax rate
of zero. As of 2001, households with two adult spouses got a higher exemption
than single households.
Subsequently, (progressively) positive marginal tax rates were applied to sub-
sequent brackets. In later years, the system was been simpliﬁed to a two-bracket
system with a zero-marginal rate in bracket zero and a single positive one. Tax
reforms were discontinuous but frequent and marginal, in that every few years
bracket limits have been adjusted, marginal rates have been changed, or the num-
ber of tax brackets has been varied. In addition, in all years between nominal
changes, the real value of the exemption threshold was affected by inﬂation (ﬁscal
drag).
Table B.1 reports the main aspects of the Swedish wealth tax exemptions and
21The Swedish repeal of the wealth tax followed similar repeals in Austria (from 2001), Denmark
(from 1997), Finland (from 2006), and Italy (from 2005).
22The personal income tax was joint between spouses before 1971. From 1966 couples could,
however, apply to be treated as single ﬁlers, see Selin (2009).
23The owner to the international clothing retail company H&M threatened to leave the country in
1990s. The government, therefore, introduced some new valuation principles that in practice meant
that a handful superrich basically became tax exempt.45
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Figure B.1: Wealth tax revenue: Total and micro data, logarithm
rates during the period 1948–2006.
Figure B.1 shows how wealth tax revenue from the households in the micro
datasetcorrespondstotal wealth taxrevenue. Itisclearfromﬁgure thattaxrevenue
according to the micro data tracks total tax revenue surprisingly well.46
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Appendix C Estimation
This appendix shows how to estimate a general heterogeneous AR(p) ﬁxed effects
probit model by Maximum Likelihood. The main perceived difﬁculty lies in the
factthatithasaverylargenumberofparameters, andthattheassociatedcovariance
matrix is, therefore, of very large dimensions.
Greene (2004) gives details on estimation by Newton-Raphson making use of
the structure of the associated sparse Hessians for a limited dependent variable
model with ﬁxed individual constants. Greene refers to Prentice and Gloeckler
(1978). We extend the idea to the heterogeneous AR(p) ﬁxed effects probit.








i yi,t−j +xitβ +αi+εit,
where y★ is the latent variable of interest, y = 1[y★ > 0] deﬁnes the observed 0/1
indicator, x is a K vector of regressors. Let i = 1,...,N index individuals and
t = 1,...,T time. For notational convenience only, we focus on the case of a
balanced panel in what follows. Parameters to be estimated are β (a K-vector),
α (an N-vector) and p different N-vectors γ j, j = 1,...,p, so that the model has
a total of (p+1)N +K parameters. With error ε an NT vector of i.i.d. standard
normal variates, the model is a probit.









where β0 is a (generic) constant and P denotes the probit probability.







′)′ with gα =( gα1,...,gαN)′,














Hββ Hβα Hβγ1 ⋅⋅⋅ Hβγp












with blocks such as Hβα =( hβα1
′,...,hβαN
′)′, and so on.
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ι = 0. (13)
BothH and variance-covariance matrixΣ=−H−1 are of size((p+1)N+K)×
((p+1)N+K). This matrix can be obtained using inversion of a K×K matrix and
pre- and postmultiplication with a series of matrices of at most order (p+1)N×K,
as we will show now.
The implication is that a simple Newton-Raphson algorithm can be used to
estimate the model quickly and efﬁciently. Denote the parameter vector by θ =
(β′,α′,γ1′,γ2′,...,γp′)′ then the updating step of parameters between two itera-
tions ℓ and ℓ+1i s
θℓ+1 = θℓ+sΣg
Scalar s is a step size optimization parameter.
Calculation of Σ relies on recursive application of an inversion rule for parti-
tioned matrices, and on the fact that most of the individual blocks of the Hessian
are diagonal, owing to independence between units, see (13).




























i denotes the ith diagonal element of Hγpγp. Consider next the coefﬁcients























There is no numerical inversion involved as all matrices (including Hγqγq
) are di-
agonal. Multiplication of these diagonal matrices can be performed on vectors.
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It is immediately obvious that we can again calculate the inverse without numerical
inversion, applying the rule used in (14) again. Thus we can proceed until lag
p−(p−1). Let the Hessian at that stage be denoted by Hγγ. The next item in the







Hαα Hαγ1 ⋅⋅⋅ Hαγp





























and Hαγ is the N × pN upper right submatrix of Hαγα; Hαα is N ×N diagonal,
hence, H−1
αγα can be obtained without numerical inversion, too.














where Hβαγ and Hβαγ are the upper right K ×(p+1)N submatrices of H−1 and
















As Hββ is not diagonal, calculating Hββ involves numerical inversion of a K ×K
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